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We develop a model in which an entrepreneur learns about the average profitability of a private firm
before deciding whether to take the firm public. In this decision, the entrepreneur trades off diversification
benefits of going public against benefits of private control. The model predicts that firm profitability
should decline after the IPO, on average, and that this decline should be larger for firms with more
volatile profitability and firms with less uncertain average profitability. These predictions are supported
empirically in a sample of 7,183 IPOs in the U.S. between 1975 and 2004.
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The decision to go public is one of the most important decisions made by privately held ﬁrms.
This decision can have various motives, such as to diversify the entrepreneur’s holdings, to
raise capital for investment, to exploit favorable market conditions, to facilitate acquisitions,
to improve the liquidity of the ﬁrm’s shares, to ﬁnd the ﬁrm’s market value, and to make the
ﬁrm more visible. One complicating factor in the IPO decision is that the private ﬁrm’s future
cash ﬂow is highly uncertain. This uncertainty makes it diﬃcult for both the entrepreneur
and the outside investors to value the private ﬁrm. We examine the eﬀect of this uncertainty
on the decision to go public and on ﬁrm proﬁtability around the IPO.
We develop a model of the optimal IPO decision in the presence of learning about average
proﬁtability. In the model, the proﬁtability of a private ﬁrm mean-reverts around an un-
known mean and agents learn about this mean by observing realized proﬁts. There are two
types of risk-averse agents: investors, who are well diversiﬁed, and an entrepreneur, whose en-
tire wealth is tied up in the private ﬁrm. The entrepreneur suﬀers from under-diversiﬁcation
but enjoys beneﬁts of private control. If he takes his ﬁrm public, he forfeits the private
beneﬁts but achieves better diversiﬁcation by investing the IPO proceeds in publicly-traded
stocks and bonds. It is optimal for the entrepreneur to take his ﬁrm public when the market
value of the ﬁrm (value to investors) exceeds the private value of the ﬁrm (value to the
entrepreneur). We show that an IPO is more likely for ﬁrms with higher expected and cur-
rent proﬁtability, more volatile proﬁtability, more uncertain average proﬁtability, and lower
beneﬁts of private control.
In this model, it is optimal for an IPO to take place when the ﬁrm’s expected future
proﬁtability is suﬃciently high. The entrepreneur’s beneﬁts of private control are derived
from assets in place rather than from future growth opportunities. The ﬁrm’s private value
is therefore less sensitive to expected future proﬁtability than the ﬁrm’s market value is.
When expected proﬁtability rises, the market value rises faster than the private value, and
when expected proﬁtability rises high enough, it becomes optimal for the ﬁrm to be owned
publicly (by investors) rather than privately (by the entrepreneur).
The model predicts that ﬁrm proﬁtability should drop after the IPO, on average, and
that this drop should be larger for ﬁrms with more volatile proﬁtability and ﬁrms with less
uncertain average proﬁtability. These predictions follow from the endogeneity of the IPO
and from learning. For an IPO to take place, the agents’ expected proﬁtability must go up
before the IPO, as explained in the previous paragraph. According to Bayes’ rule, agents
revise their expectations upward only if they observe realized proﬁtability that is higher than
1expected. As a result, realized proﬁtability exceeds expected future proﬁtability at the time
of the IPO, and hence proﬁtability is expected to drop after the IPO. The implications for
volatility and uncertainty also follow from the basic properties of Bayesian updating. These
results come through most clearly in the context of a toy model in Section 2.
To analyze the implications of our model, we calibrate the model and compute the ex-
pected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability for a wide range of plausible parameter values, using
a closed-form solution for this expected drop. We incorporate the endogeneity of the IPO
by computing expectations conditional on an IPO being optimal. We also incorporate the
endogeneity of the private ﬁrm’s existence, recognizing that for some sets of parameter values
it is not optimal for the entrepreneur to start the private ﬁrm in the ﬁrst place. The results
show that the basic intuition from the toy model applies to our richer model as well.
We test the model’s predictions empirically in a sample of 7,183 IPOs in the U.S. between
1975 and 2004. Our evidence supports the model. Firm proﬁtability, measured as return
on equity (ROE), declines signiﬁcantly after the IPO. The average decline in quarterly ROE
is 2.7% after one year and 4.3% after three years. A post-IPO decline in proﬁtability has
already been reported by Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson,
Partch, and Shah (1997), and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) but our sample is much
larger.1 More important, we also ﬁnd that the post-IPO decline is larger for stocks with
more volatile proﬁtability and ﬁrms with less uncertain average proﬁtability. These ﬁndings,
which do not seem to appear in the literature, are consistent with our model.
While the volatility of proﬁtability can be estimated directly from realized proﬁts, un-
certainty about average proﬁtability is more diﬃcult to measure. The common proxies for
uncertainty also proxy for volatility. To separate uncertainty from volatility, we estimate
the stock price reaction to earnings announcements, which should be stronger for ﬁrms with
higher uncertainty and lower volatility. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with weaker price reactions tend
to experience larger post-IPO drops in ROE, as predicted by the model.
The model also predicts that ﬁrm proﬁtability increases before the IPO. We do not
test this prediction due to the lack of pre-IPO data, but supporting evidence is provided
by Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) who study 62 reverse LBOs that went public between
1983 and 1987. They ﬁnd that proﬁtability increases sharply before LBOs return to public
ownership and decreases thereafter, consistent with our model.
1Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) analyze 62 reverse leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in 1983–1987, Jain and
Kini (1994) study 682 IPOs in 1976–1988, Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997) examine 283 IPOs in 1980–
1983, and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) investigate 69 Italian IPOs in 1982–1992.
2Our model generates a rise and fall in proﬁtability around the IPO without asymmetric
information. In contrast, many IPO models assume that the entrepreneur has private infor-
mation about her own ﬁrm (e.g., Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). Asymmetric information
may well explain some of the observed post-IPO declines in proﬁtability, but it is not clear
how it would generate higher declines for ﬁrms with more volatile proﬁts and ﬁrms with less
uncertain average proﬁts. Another possible explanation for the proﬁtability pattern is earn-
ings management. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) argue that ﬁrms opportunistically inﬂate
their earnings through discretionary accruals shortly before going public. However, ﬁrms
that are willing to manipulate their earnings around the IPO are likely to manipulate them
after the IPO as well. Such ﬁrms are likely to smooth their post-IPO earnings, given the
apparent market preference for less volatile earnings.2 Therefore, the earnings management
hypothesis would seem to predict that the post-IPO decline in proﬁtability should be larger
for ﬁrms with less volatile post-IPO earnings, but we ﬁnd the opposite result.3
The key motive for an IPO in our model is diversiﬁcation. This motive is empirically im-
portant according to Bodnaruk, Kandel, Massa, and Simonov (2006), who study all Swedish
IPOs in 1995–2001 and ﬁnd that ﬁrms held by less diversiﬁed shareholders are more likely to
go public. In the model of Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005), the IPO decision is also
driven by the tradeoﬀ between diversiﬁcation beneﬁts and private beneﬁts, but there are
important diﬀerences between their paper and ours. First, the models are diﬀerent: in their
model, there is no learning, the cash ﬂow process is diﬀerent (binomial with known up and
down probabilities), and so are the agents’ preferences. Second, Benninga et al do not ex-
amine post-IPO proﬁtability, which is the subject of our analysis. Finally, their contribution
is theoretical whereas ours is both theoretical and empirical.
This paper is also related to the theory of “rational IPO waves” of P´ astor and Veronesi
(2005). In their model, the entrepreneur observes time-varying market conditions before
deciding when to go public. IPO waves arise because many entrepreneurs ﬁnd it optimal
to go public after market conditions improve (e.g., after the equity premium falls).4 Unlike
in that model, we hold market conditions constant, for simplicity, and focus instead on
learning about the private ﬁrm itself. In our model, unlike in theirs, observing the private
ﬁrm’s proﬁts allows the agents to learn about the ﬁrm’s average future proﬁtability. In their
model, the IPO proceeds are invested in the ﬁrm to start production, whereas in our model,
2For example, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) survey 401 ﬁnancial executives and ﬁnd that more
than three quarters of them would give up economic value in exchange for smooth earnings.
3Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that the evidence of Teoh et al is unreliable and that IPO ﬁrms
actually supply more conservative and higher-quality ﬁnancial reports than other ﬁrms.
4Consistent with this argument, CFOs identify overall stock market conditions as “the single most im-
portant determinant of timing” of an IPO in Brau and Fawcett’s (2006) survey.
3they are invested in stocks and bonds for diversiﬁcation reasons. Finally, while they focus
on optimal IPO timing, we focus on the dynamics of proﬁtability around the IPO.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2. presents a toy model that illustrates how
learning aﬀects the post-IPO dynamics of proﬁtability. Section 3. develops the full model.
Section 4. analyzes the dynamics of proﬁtability implied by the full model, with a focus on
the expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability. Section 5. presents an empirical test of the main
implications of the model. Section 6. concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. A Toy Model
In this section, we present a simple model that illustrates the eﬀect of learning on the behavior
of proﬁtability after an IPO. There are two periods, 0 and 1, in which an entrepreneur decides
whether to take his private ﬁrm public. This decision is made based on a cutoﬀ rule: an IPO
takes place if the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁtability exceeds a given cutoﬀ. (This type of rule is
shown to be optimal in the full model in Section 3.) Let ρ denote the cutoﬀ, which is known,
and ρ denote the ﬁrm’s average proﬁtability, which is unknown.
At time 0, the entrepreneur’s prior beliefs about ρ are given by the normal distribution,
ρ ∼ N
￿





At time 1, the entrepreneur observes a signal about average proﬁtability ρ, namely realized








Result 1. Firm proﬁtability is expected to fall after an IPO at time 1.
To prove this result, we ﬁrst compute the entrepreneur’s posterior beliefs after observing
the signal. Using Bayes’ rule, the posterior distribution of ρ is given by
ρ | ρ ∼ N
￿













An IPO takes place at time 1 if expected proﬁtability exceeds the cutoﬀ ρ:
b ρ>ρ. (6)
4Since the IPO takes place at time 1, there is no IPO at time 0, so that
b ρ0 <ρ. (7)
Combining equations (6) and (7), we have b ρ>b ρ0. It then follows from equation (4) that
ρ>b ρ. (8)
In words, for an IPO to take place at time 1, realized proﬁtability ρ must exceed expected
future proﬁtability b ρ. As a result, the post-IPO proﬁtability is expected to be lower than ρ.
At time 0, the expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability is E0(ρ − b ρ | IPO at time 1) > 0.
To simplify the algebraic exposition, add the assumption that b ρ0 =0 .
Result 2. The post-IPO drop in proﬁtability is expected to be large when the volatility of
proﬁtability (σρ) is high and when prior uncertainty about average proﬁtability (b σ0) is low.
To prove this result, rewrite equation (4) as
ρ − b ρ = w0(ρ − b ρ0). (9)
The assumption b ρ0 = 0 implies ρ>0, so the expected percentage drop in proﬁtability is
E0
 
ρ − b ρ
ρ
| IPO at time 1
!
= w0. (10)
From equation (5), w0 increases with σρ and decreases with b σ0. As a result, the expected
percentage drop in proﬁtability after the IPO is high when proﬁtability is highly volatile and
when there is low uncertainty about average proﬁtability.
The intuition behind both results is simple. For an IPO to take place at time 1, expected
proﬁtability must go up between times 0 and 1, so realized proﬁtability at time 1 must exceed
expected proﬁtability to “pull it up” via Bayesian updating. Since realized proﬁtability
exceeds expected proﬁtability at the IPO, proﬁtability is expected to fall after the IPO
(Result 1). If volatility is higher, realized proﬁtability is a less precise signal, so it must rise
by more to pull expected proﬁtability above the IPO cutoﬀ. Similarly, if uncertainty is lower,
realized proﬁtability must rise by more to overcome stronger prior beliefs. In both cases, the
gap between realized and expected proﬁtability widens, so the post-IPO drop in proﬁtability
is larger (Result 2). This intuition applies not only to the percentage drop but also to the
absolute drop in proﬁtability. Note that our arguments rely only on the endogeneity of the
IPO decision (equation (6)), the endogeneity of the private ﬁrm’s existence before the IPO
(equation (7)), and Bayesian updating (equation (3)).
5In the next section, we develop a richer model with more realistic dynamics for prof-
itability and additional assumptions about agent preferences and investment opportunities.
In that model, we show that a version of the IPO rule in equation (6) is optimal, with
an endogenous cutoﬀ ρ that depends on uncertainty and volatility. The endogeneity of ρ
complicates the analysis, but we show that Results 1 and 2 hold also in the full model for
plausible parameter values. For the reader’s convenience, the full model uses some of the
same notation as the toy model to denote the same concepts, but none of the above equations
apply outside of Section 2.
3. The Full Model
We consider an economy with two types of agents, investors and an entrepreneur. The agents
can invest in two assets, risky public equity (“stocks”) and a risk-free bond (“bonds”). A
third asset, risky private equity, can be created by the entrepreneur at time 0.
At time 0, investors are endowed with a large amount of stocks and bonds. The en-
trepreneur is endowed with a patent-protected technology and the initial wealth W0. To pro-
duce a stream of proﬁts, the technology requires an initial lump-sum investment of B0 = W0.
The entrepreneur has three choices at time 0: start a private ﬁrm that implements the tech-
nology, sell the patent, or discard the patent. If the entrepreneur chooses to start a ﬁrm,
he invests his wealth in the technology and begins producing. He also acquires an option to
take the ﬁrm public at a future time τ,0<τ<T. We assume that τ is exogenously given,
for simplicity, and that this is the only time when an IPO can take place. If the entrepreneur
chooses to go public at time τ, he sells the ﬁrm to investors for its fair market value.5 The
entrepreneur’s decisions at times 0 and τ are irreversible.
The ﬁrm owning the patent-protected technology uses capital Bt to produce earnings at
the rate Yt. The ﬁrm’s proﬁtability ρt = Yt/Bt follows the mean-reverting process
dρt = φ(ρ − ρt)dt + σρ,1dX1,t + σρ,2dX2,t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (11)
where ρ denotes average proﬁtability, φ denotes the speed of mean reversion, and X1,t and
X2,t are uncorrelated Brownian motions that capture systematic (X1,t) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
(X2,t) shocks to ﬁrm proﬁtability.6 The ﬁrm reinvests all of its earnings. The patent expires
at time T, at which point the ﬁrm’s market value equals the book value, MT = BT.7
5In reality, the entrepreneur often retains a substantial part of equity after an IPO. Assuming that the
entrepreneur sells the whole ﬁrm simpliﬁes both the calculations and the exposition. We believe that none
of our qualitative results would change if we allowed the entrepreneur to retain some equity.
6Empirically, ﬁrm proﬁtability is mean-reverting, e.g., Beaver (1970) and Fama and French (2000).
7See P´ astor and Veronesi (2003) for a more detailed justiﬁcation of the terminal value assumption.
6Both the entrepreneur and investors are fully rational utility-maximizing agents. Investor
preferences are characterized by a pricing kernel πt, which follows the stochastic process
dπt
πt
= −rdt − σπ,1dX1, (12)
where r is the risk-free rate and dX1 is perfectly correlated with the return on public equity.















where cu denotes consumption, γ>1 is the local curvature of the utility function, β is the
intertemporal discount, η is a constant, and WT is the entrepreneur’s terminal wealth. For
simplicity, we assume that the entrepreneur retires at time T (when the patent expires).
As long as the entrepreneur owns the private ﬁrm, he consumes beneﬁts of private control.
These beneﬁts include any costs saved by a ﬁrm that is not publicly traded (e.g., the costs
of separating ownership from control, reporting costs, administrative costs, auditing costs,
etc.) as well as beneﬁts commonly referred to as private beneﬁts of control (e.g., Dyck and
Zingales, 2004). We distinguish beneﬁts of private control from private beneﬁts of control
because the latter beneﬁts can be consumed not only by entrepreneurs but also by managers
of publicly traded ﬁrms. There are no beneﬁts of private control if the ﬁrm is owned by
(disperse) investors. For simplicity, we assume that the consumption ﬂow from beneﬁts of
private control is proportional to the size of the ﬁrm as measured by assets in place,
ct = αBt, (14)
and that the entrepreneur consumes nothing else while managing the private ﬁrm. The
entrepreneur cannot alter this consumption path by borrowing or lending.8
There is no asymmetric information. Average proﬁtability ρ in equation (11) is unknown
to all agents, investors and entrepreneurs alike. All other parameters are known. Agent
beliefs about ρ at time t = 0 are represented by the normal prior distribution,
ρ ∼ N
￿





All agents observe realized proﬁtability ρt as well as πt and they update their beliefs about
ρ dynamically following Bayes’ rule.
Under the assumptions detailed above, we solve for the following:
8Allowing limited borrowing and lending would not alter our basic intuition (and hence the conclusions)
but it would signiﬁcantly complicate the calculations.
7(a) The dynamics of the agents’ beliefs about ρ (Section 3.1.)
(b) The value of the ﬁrm to investors (Section 3.2.)
(c) The value of the ﬁrm to the entrepreneur (Section 3.3.)
(d) The conditions under which the entrepreneur ﬁnds it optimal to take the ﬁrm public
at time τ (Section 3.4.)
(e) The conditions under which the entrepreneur ﬁnds it optimal to start a private ﬁrm at
time 0 (Section 3.5.)
(f) The dynamics of ﬁrm proﬁtability after the IPO (Section 4.)
3.1. Learning
Following standard results on Bayesian updating in continuous time, the agents’ posterior
beliefs about average proﬁtability ρ at time t are summarized by the normal distribution,
ρ ∼ N
￿





where the posterior mean and variance evolve over time according to




















and dc X2,t is a Brownian motion deﬁned as the normalized expectation error of the idiosyn-
cratic shock. See Lemma 1 of P´ astor and Veronesi (2003).
3.2. Value of the Firm to Investors (“Market Value”)
The outside investors value the ﬁrm as the present value of the terminal payoﬀ BT. Given
the investors’ preferences, the market value of the ﬁrm at any time t is given by Mt =
Et [πTBT]/πt, where πt follows the process in equation (12) and Bt follows the process
dBt = ρtBtdt. (19)
Our assumptions allow us to obtain a closed-form solution for the ﬁrm’s market value:




where the functions of time Q0(s), Q1(s), Q2(s), and Q3 (s) are given in the Appendix.
This result corresponds to Proposition 2 of P´ astor and Veronesi (2003). At this point, the
overlap with P´ astor and Veronesi (2003) ends.
83.3. Value of the Firm to the Entrepreneur
At time τ, the entrepreneur must decide whether to take his private ﬁrm public. This deci-
sion is made by comparing two utility values:
1. The utility resulting from selling the ﬁrm in an IPO at time τ and investing the pro-
ceeds in stocks and bonds until time T
2. The utility resulting from owning the ﬁrm between times τ and T
We compute the two utility values in Sections 3.3.1. and 3.3.2., respectively.
3.3.1. Utility Value of Selling the Firm in an IPO
If the entrepreneur sells the ﬁrm at time τ, he receives the fair market value Mτ given
in equation (20) and invests Mτ in publicly-traded stocks and bonds. To compute the
utility value of selling the ﬁrm, we ﬁrst compute the utility value of any generic amount
of wealth Wt under the assumption that this wealth is invested in stocks and bonds. This
task is made simple by the fact that we have complete markets, in which the stock and
bond investment opportunities are captured by the state price density πt in equation (12).
Cox and Huang (1989) show that the dynamic maximization problem of an agent deciding




















































where λ is the constant Lagrange multiplier from the maximization problem. The resulting
value function for the intertemporal utility is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let Wt denote the entrepreneur’s ﬁnancial wealth, which can be allocated
to stocks or bonds in any proportions. The value function from optimal investment is































































Thus, selling the ﬁrm at time τ gives the entrepreneur utility equal to V (Mτ,τ).
93.3.2. Utility Value of Keeping the Firm Private
If the entrepreneur decides not to go public at time τ, he will continue consuming beneﬁts of
private control and his ﬁnal wealth will be equal to BT. Thus, according to equations (13)
















This utility is characterized explicitly in the following proposition.


























where the function ZO is given in the Appendix.
3.4. The IPO Decision
The IPO decision reﬂects the tradeoﬀ between diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of going public and
beneﬁts of private control. The entrepreneur will sell the ﬁrm at time τ if the utility from
investing the IPO proceeds in stocks and bonds is higher than the utility from continuing to
run the ﬁrm and consume private beneﬁts. The entrepreneur will go public if and only if
V (Mτ,τ) >V
O (Bτ,τ), (23)








deﬁne the ﬁrm’s “private value” at time τ. (The entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between owning
the private ﬁrm and having Pτ dollars optimally invested in stocks and bonds.) We can then
restate condition (23) as Mτ >P τ. That is, an IPO takes place if and only if the ﬁrm’s
market value exceeds the private value.
Proposition 3: An IPO takes place at time τ if and only if




b Z (ρτ, b ρτ, b στ,σ ρ;u − τ;T)du, (25)
where f (T − τ,b στ,σ ρ) and b Z (ρτ, b ρτ, b στ,σ ρ;u − τ;T) are functions given in the Appendix.
Note that f is decreasing in both b στ and σρ,2, b Z is increasing in both ρτ and b ρτ, and b Z>0.
10Corollary 1: An IPO at time τ is more likely when
(a) beneﬁts of private control, α, are lower
(b) uncertainty about average proﬁtability, b στ, is higher
(c) the idiosyncratic component of the volatility of proﬁtability, σρ,2, is higher
(d) current and/or expected proﬁtability, ρτ and b ρτ, are higher
Part (a) follows immediately from the fact that private beneﬁts can be consumed by the
entrepreneur but not by the disperse group of investors. Mathematically, the right-hand side
of (25) decreases with α but the left-hand side does not depend on α.
The intuition behind parts (b) and (c) is also simple. If the ﬁrm is privately owned, higher
uncertainty b στ or idiosyncratic volatility σρ,2 make the entrepreneur’s future consumption
more volatile. The risk-averse entrepreneur dislikes this volatility because he is not diversiﬁed
(formally, V O is decreasing in both b στ and σρ,2), and the only way he can diversify is by
selling the ﬁrm in an IPO. Since investors are well diversiﬁed, they are in a better position to
bear the risk associated with the private ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow process. (The ﬁrm can be thought of
as small relative to the investors’ other holdings since πt in equation (12) does not depend on
b στ or σρ,2.) In fact, if the ﬁrm is publicly owned, its market value in equation (20) increases
with both uncertainty and idiosyncratic volatility, due to the convexity eﬀect discussed in
P´ astor and Veronesi (2003, 2006). In short, parts (b) and (c) follow because the entrepreneur
dislikes uncertainty and idiosyncratic volatility but investors don’t.
For most plausible parameter values, part (c) holds not only for idiosyncratic volatility
σρ,2 but also for total volatility σρσ0
ρ = σ2
ρ,1 + σ2
ρ,2. When σρ,2 increases, the left-hand side
of (23) increases while the right-hand side decreases, making an IPO more likely. When
σρ,1 increases, both sides of (23) tend to decrease because systematic volatility generally
reduces market value. The right-hand side typically decreases by more, so an IPO is usually
more likely also after σρ,1 increases. Combining the eﬀects of σρ,1 and σρ,2, we ﬁnd for most
parameter values that an IPO is more likely when total volatility σρσ0
ρ is higher.
Although the right-hand side of (25) is always positive, the left-hand side becomes nega-
tive when uncertainty and/or volatility are suﬃciently high. That is, for any α, there exist
levels of uncertainty and volatility above which an IPO always takes place.
Part (d) follows from the fact that the right-hand side of (25) is increasing in both ρτ
and b ρτ (because ∂ b Z/∂ρτ > 0 and ∂ b Z/∂b ρτ > 0) while the left-hand side is independent
of both quantities. Put diﬀerently, the market value of the ﬁrm increases with ρτ and b ρτ
more rapidly than the private value does. The eﬀect of expected future proﬁtability, b ρτ,i s
11stronger and easier to explain. Recall from equation (14) that beneﬁts of private control are
derived from assets in place (Bt) rather than from future growth opportunities. The ﬁrm’s
private value is therefore less sensitive to b ρτ than the ﬁrm’s (more forward-looking) market
value is. Increases in b ρτ push up the private value (because Bt grows at the rate of ρt) but
they push up the market value even more. Therefore, higher b ρτ makes an IPO more likely:
The entrepreneur becomes more willing to forego private beneﬁts in exchange for ﬁnancial
wealth, because doing so moves him to a more valuable consumption path.
The new consumption path is more valuable in part because it is smoother over the
entrepreneur’s lifetime. When b ρτ increases, the entrepreneur expects higher consumption in
the future. He wants to smooth his consumption by consuming more today but he cannot;
his consumption is given by private beneﬁts in equation (14). If b ρτ is suﬃciently high, the
entrepreneur’s consumption path under private ownership becomes so unattractively steep
that he ﬁnds it optimal to sell the ﬁrm. After cashing out in an IPO, the entrepreneur can
smooth his consumption by trading stocks and bonds.
3.4.1. The Endogenous Cutoﬀ Rule for an IPO
Next, we modify the condition in Proposition 3 to obtain an equivalent condition that resem-
bles the cutoﬀ rule in the toy model in Section 2. Deﬁne ‘excess proﬁtability’ as xτ = ρτ − b ρτ.
The condition (25) can be restated in terms of xτ as follows:











where Z (xτ, b ρτ, b στ,σ ρ,u− τ,T) is a function similar to b Z (see Appendix). We show in
the Appendix that h(xτ, b ρτ) is monotonically increasing in xτ and b ρτ. Assuming that
f (T − τ,b στ,σ ρ) is suﬃciently large, we can deﬁne the cutoﬀ ρ(xτ; b στ,σ ρ) such that
h
￿
xτ,ρ(xτ; b στ,σ ρ)
￿
= f (T − τ,b στ,σ ρ).
If f (T − τ,b στ,σ ρ) is too low for such a cutoﬀ to exist, we set ρ(xτ; b στ,σ ρ)=−∞.
Corollary 2: An IPO takes place at time τ if and only if
b ρτ >ρ(xτ; b στ,σ ρ). (27)
In words, an IPO takes place if expected proﬁtability is suﬃciently high. This rule is similar
to the cutoﬀ rule assumed in the toy model in Section 2. except that the cutoﬀ ρ(xτ; b στ,σ ρ)
here is endogenous: it depends on the model parameters including uncertainty and volatility,
and it is also decreasing in xτ. (If the current excess proﬁtability xτ is high, the expected
12long-run proﬁtability b ρτ need not be as high for an IPO to occur.) The intuition behind
Corollary 2 is the same as that behind Corollary 1(d). When b ρτ rises, the market value rises
faster than the private value because the former value is more sensitive to b ρτ. When b ρτ rises
suﬃciently, it becomes optimal for the ﬁrm to be owned publicly rather than privately.9
In Section 4., we use Corollary 2 to compute the expected drop in proﬁtability after an
IPO, or Et
h
xτ|b ρτ >ρ(xτ; b στ,σ ρ)
i
. But ﬁrst, we step back to time 0. Having characterized
the optimal decision at time τ, we can solve for the optimal decision at time 0.
3.5. The Decision to Start a Private Firm
In this section, we solve for the conditions under which the entrepreneur ﬁnds it optimal to
start a private ﬁrm at time 0. These conditions restrict the parameter space, allowing us to
incorporate the endogeneity of the private ﬁrm’s existence in the following section.
At time t = 0, the entrepreneur has three choices:
(A) Start a private ﬁrm. (Invest W0 in the technology to start production, keep the ﬁrm.)
(B) Sell the patent to investors. (Invest W0 in the technology to start production, sell it
to investors for its fair market value M0, invest M0 in stocks and bonds.)
(C) Discard the patent. (Invest W0 in stocks and bonds.)
The entrepreneur makes a utility-maximizing choice between (A), (B), and (C). Under
choice (C), his expected utility is V (B0,0), where V is given in Proposition 1 (recall that
B0 = W0). Under choice (B), his utility is V (M0,0), where M0 comes from equation (20).
Under choice (A), his expected utility, which we denote by V O
0 (B0,0), is given by
V
O











































where “Pr” stands for “probability” as of time 0. There are three terms on the right-hand
side. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the beneﬁts of private control that the entrepreneur consumes
while running the ﬁrm between times 0 and τ. The second term is the present value of
9Ours is unlikely to be the only mechanism that can deliver a cutoﬀ rule for an IPO. For example, consider
a model a la Leland and Pyle (1977) in which an entrepreneur seeking IPO ﬁnancing must signal high eﬀort
to outside investors. It seems plausible for high average proﬁtability to serve as a signal of high eﬀort,
which could make an IPO optimal if average proﬁtability exceeds a cutoﬀ. Our primary interest is in the
implications of the cutoﬀ rule, however this rule is rationalized, for ﬁrm proﬁtability around the IPO.
13expected utility conditional on an IPO taking place at time τ, which happens if and only if
b ρτ >ρ(see Corollary 2). Recall that in an IPO, the entrepreneur sells the ﬁrm to investors
for Mτ and invests the proceeds in stocks and bonds. The third term is the utility obtained
if no IPO takes place, in which case the entrepreneur remains non-diversiﬁed after time
τ but continues enjoying private beneﬁts until time T. The calculation of V O
0 (B0,0) in
equation (28) is challenging, but we have obtained a closed-form solution. Since the formula
for V O
0 (B0,0) takes up a full page of text, we relegate it to the Appendix.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for (A) to be the optimal choice is
V
O
0 (B0,0) > max{V (M0,0),V (B0,0)}. (29)
This is the condition that we impose in the calibration. Due to the complicated formula for
V O
0 (B0,0), this condition is not transparent. To gain more insight into the decision at time
0, we examine a simpler suﬃcient condition for (A) to be the optimal choice:
V
O (B0,0) > max{V (M0,0),V (B0,0)}. (30)
This condition is identical to condition (29) except that V O
0 (B0,0) is replaced by V O (B0,0).
The left-hand side of condition (30) is the entrepreneur’s expected utility from running
the private ﬁrm between times 0 and T. If the inequality (30) holds, then choice (A) is
superior to both (B) and (C) even without taking into account the value of the entrepreneur’s
option to sell the ﬁrm at time τ. This option makes choice (A) more attractive, so that
V O
0 (B0,0) >VO (B0,0), making condition (30) suﬃcient but not necessary. We do not use
condition (30) for anything other than providing intuition through the following corollary.
Corollary 3: Condition (30) is more likely to be satisﬁed if
(a) beneﬁts of private control, α, are higher
(b) uncertainty about average proﬁtability, b σ0, is lower
(c) the idiosyncratic component of the volatility of proﬁtability, σρ,2, is lower
The entrepreneur is more likely to start a private ﬁrm if beneﬁts of private control are larger
and if the cash ﬂow stream is more stable. The intuition is similar to that behind Corollary 1.
When private beneﬁts increase, private value increases relative to market value because these
beneﬁts can be consumed by the entrepreneur but not by the outside investors. Private value
also increases relative to market value when uncertainty and volatility decrease, because the
entrepreneur is not diversiﬁed whereas the investors are. However, the negative eﬀects of
uncertainty and volatilityare likelyto be mitigated by the fact that uncertainty and volatility
increase the value of the IPO option that is omitted from condition (30).
144. Proﬁtability Dynamics Around an IPO
In this section, we analyze the evolution of proﬁtability around an IPO. Without conditioning
on an IPO, proﬁtability ρt follows the simple mean-reverting process in equation (11) and
expected proﬁtability b ρt follows the martingale process in equation (17). Conditioning on
an IPO changes the dynamics of ρt and b ρt in an interesting way, as we show below.
4.1. Endogeneity of an IPO
To analyze the proﬁtability dynamics around an IPO, we simulate many paths of shocks from
the model, and then we average the proﬁtability paths across those simulations in which it
is optimal for an IPO to take place. Such an approach produces the model-implied expected
pattern in proﬁtability while incorporating the endogeneity of the IPO decision.
Table 1 reports the baseline parameter values used in the simulations. The parameters
for the proﬁtability process (σρ,1, σρ,2, and φ) are taken from P´ astor and Veronesi (2003) who
estimate them from the return on equity data of all U.S. public ﬁrms in 1962–2000. We also
choose the same risk-free rate r =0 .03 per year, the same pricing kernel volatility σπ =0 .6,
and the same horizon T = 15 years as P´ astor and Veronesi. These authors report the grand
median of proﬁtability of 0.11 per year for public ﬁrms. For a typical private ﬁrm, the
average proﬁtability ρ should be lower than 0.11 because only private ﬁrms whose average
proﬁtability is perceived to be suﬃciently high go public in the model. Therefore, we choose
a lower prior mean of ρ, b ρ0 =0 .07. We set the prior uncertainty equal to b σ0 =0 .05, so the
two-standard-deviation prior bounds for ρ are −0.03 and 0.17 per year. We pick τ = 5 years,
which is close to the median age of IPO ﬁrms in the 1990s (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). We
choose risk aversion γ = 2 and the subjective discount rate β =0 .03. We consider two values
of initial proﬁtability, ρ0 = b ρ0 =0 .07 and ρ0 = 0. The latter choice is motivated by the fact
that private ﬁrms typically do not produce any proﬁts when they are started. Measuring the
beneﬁts of private control is diﬃcult. We choose α =0 .10, a round number.10 Later on, we
analyze the sensitivity of our results to α and we also average across many plausible values
of α when analyzing the expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability.
We conduct simulations as follows. First, we draw ρ from its prior distribution in equa-
tion (15). Starting from ρ0, we simulate the realizations of ρt between times 0 and T by
discretizing the process (11) and randomly drawing the Brownian shocks dX1,t and dX2,t.
Analogously, we simulate the realizations of the pricing kernel πt from the process (12).
Given the series of ρt and πt, we compute the dynamics of the posterior beliefs from equa-
10Benninga et al (2005) use a range of private beneﬁts centered on 10% of cash ﬂow in their simulations.
15tions (17) and (18). We then check whether the IPO condition (23) is satisﬁed at time τ.I f
it is, we keep the simulated path; otherwise we discard it. We repeat this procedure until
we generate 10,000 simulated paths for which an IPO occurred at time τ.
Figure 1 plots the average paths of realized proﬁtability (ρt; solid line) and expected
proﬁtability (b ρt; dashed line), where the averages are computed across the 10,000 simulations
in which an IPO takes place at time τ = 5. Given the large number of simulations, these
paths represent the expected patterns in ρt and b ρt conditional on an IPO. In Panel A, the
initial proﬁtability ρ0 = b ρ0; in Panel B, ρ0 = 0. In both panels, the ﬁgure shows that realized
proﬁtability ρt rises sharply before the IPO and declines after the IPO, on average. Expected
proﬁtability b ρt also rises before the IPO but it remains ﬂat after the IPO.
To understand the pattern in expected proﬁtability, b ρt, recall from Corollary 2 that in
order for an IPO to take place at time τ, b ρτ must exceed a cutoﬀ: b ρτ >ρ . Ex ante, b ρt
is a martingale (equation (17)), but the ex-post conditioning on b ρτ >ρimplies that b ρt is
expected to increase before the IPO. Indeed, in Figure 1, b ρt rises from 0.07 to almost 0.09
between times 0 and τ. After the IPO, there is no more conditioning on an ex post event,
so b ρt is constant in expectation due to its martingale property.
The pattern in realized proﬁtability, ρt, is also intuitive. As discussed above, expected
proﬁtability b ρt increases before the IPO, on average. In a rational model of learning, an
expectation is revised upward only if the realization is higher than expected. To cause
upward revisions in b ρt, realized proﬁtability must rise faster than expected under its mean-
reverting process. This is why ρt rises so sharply before the IPO.
Why does ρt typically fall after the IPO? We answer in two steps: ﬁrst, we explain why
it is likely that ρτ > b ρτ, and second, why ρτ > b ρτ implies a post-IPO decline in ρt. First,
as argued above, ρt must rise before the IPO to cause upward revisions in b ρt so that b ρτ
can exceed the IPO cutoﬀ. When ρ0 = b ρ0 (Panel A), realized proﬁtability must rise above
expected proﬁtability in order to “pull it up” via Bayesian updating, making ρτ > b ρτ very
likely. When ρ0 = 0 (Panel B), ρt must rise faster than expected given its rate of mean
reversion. Given the parameter values in Table 1, ρt rises so fast that it “catches up” with
b ρt (i.e., ρt = b ρt) before time τ. After that point, the only way for ρt to pull b ρt higher toward
the cutoﬀ is for ρt to rise above b ρt. Again, ρτ > b ρτ seems likely. Second, ρτ > b ρτ means that
ρτ exceeds its expected long-run mean, b ρτ, at the time of the IPO. Since b ρt has no expected
drift after the IPO, ρτ > b ρτ implies that ρt is expected to fall after the IPO.
Note that the same basic pattern in ρt can obtain even in the absence of learning, simply
16as a result of mean reversion in proﬁtability and the endogeneity of the IPO decision.11 The
case of no learning is a special case of our framework in which average proﬁtability ρ is a
known constant, so that b ρt = ρ and b σt = 0 for all t. In that case, it is useful to restate the
condition (26) in terms of ρτ. Since h(xτ, b ρτ) is monotonically increasing in xτ, there exists
a cutoﬀ ρ(ρ) such that an IPO takes place at time τ if and only if ρτ exceeds this cutoﬀ:
ρτ >ρ(ρ). (31)
For many plausible parameter values, this cutoﬀ is larger than ρ0, ρ >ρ 0, which implies that
ρt must rise between times 0 and τ to exceed ρ. Whether ρt falls after the IPO is not clear
but for many parameter values it does. If ρ > ρ then ρt is almost guaranteed to fall after
the IPO in the long run because its value at the IPO exceeds its long-run mean: ρτ >ρ> ρ.
Even if ρ is smaller than ρ but not much smaller, ρt will fall after the IPO, on average.
Also note that if we average ρt and b ρt across the simulations in which no IPO takes place
at time τ, the resulting patterns are opposite to those in Figure 1: b ρt falls before time τ and
stays constant after time τ, on average, and ρt also falls before time τ but rises slowly after
time τ, mean-reverting toward the higher value of b ρt.
We also examine the sensitivity of the proﬁtability pattern to changes in the baseline
parameters from Table 1. We change one parameter at a time, rerun the simulations, compute
averages across the simulations in which an IPO took place, and plot the resulting average
paths of ρt in Figure 2. For comparison, the solid line plots the baseline case, already
described in Figure 1. The dash-dot line plots ρt for a higher value of private beneﬁts,
α =0 .11. The pattern in realized proﬁtability is more pronounced than in the baseline case:
a steeper pre-IPO increase in ρt is followed by a larger post-IPO decrease. As α increases,
the private value of the ﬁrm increases but the market value does not, so the entrepreneur
becomes less willing to sell the ﬁrm in an IPO (see Corollary 1). To induce the entrepreneur
to sell, b ρt must rise by more than in the baseline case because it must exceed a higher hurdle
in Corollary 2. A larger increase in b ρt can only be induced by a larger increase in ρt, hence ρt
rises by more than in the baseline case. Given the basic properties of Bayesian updating, the
pre-IPO increase in ρt must also be larger than the pre-IPO increase in b ρt, so the post-IPO
decline in ρt (toward its long-run mean b ρt) is steeper.
The dotted line plots ρt for a lower value of prior uncertainty, b σ0 =0 .04. The post-IPO
fall in ρt is slightly larger than in the baseline case. This result is driven by learning: when
uncertainty is lower, prior beliefs about ρ are stronger, so ρt must rise higher relative to b ρt in
11Similar mean-reversion arguments have been proposed by Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) for reverse
LBOs and by Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2006) for SEOs. Mean reversion does not have the same predictions
as learning, e.g., it does not predict a larger post-IPO drop in ROE for ﬁrms with lower uncertainty.
17order to pull b ρt above any given IPO cutoﬀ. One complication is that this cutoﬀ endogenously
depends on uncertainty. Lower uncertainty makes private ownership more valuable to the
entrepreneur (Corollary 1), which raises the IPO cutoﬀ for b ρt. The higher cutoﬀ typically
ampliﬁes the post-IPO drop in proﬁtability.12
The dashed line plots ρt for more volatile proﬁtability, which we obtain by increasing
both σρ,1 and σρ,2 to 0.065. The rise and fall in ρt are steeper than in the baseline case. The
main reason for this result is learning: higher volatility makes ρt a less precise signal about
ρ,s oρt must rise higher relative to b ρt in order to pull b ρt above a given IPO cutoﬀ. We also
recognize that this cutoﬀ endogenously depends on volatility. When σρ,2 increases, the ﬁrm’s
private value is reduced relative to its market value, making an IPO more attractive, thus
reducing the IPO cutoﬀ. The cutoﬀ also depends on σρ,1, but this dependence is ambiguous.
Overall, the dependence of the cutoﬀ on volatility typically weakens the tent-shape pattern
in ρt around the IPO. In subsequent analysis, we work with total volatility of proﬁtability,
in part because the empirical separation of σρ,1 from σρ,2 is diﬃcult and in part because the
theoretical eﬀect of σρ,1 on the IPO decision is ambiguous.
4.2. Endogeneity of the Private Firm’s Existence
In Section 4.1., we analyze IPO proﬁtability for plausible sets of parameter values. Some
parameter sets are inadmissible, though, because the condition (29) is not satisﬁed, meaning
that it is not optimal to start a private ﬁrm at time 0. For example, it is optimal to start the
private ﬁrm for the parameters in Panels A of Figures 1 and 2, but not for the parameters in
Panels B (where it is optimal to discard the patent at time 0). This consideration can aﬀect
the expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability. For example, Figure 2 shows that this drop is
lower if private beneﬁts are lower. However, if private beneﬁts are too low, it is not optimal
for the entrepreneur to start a private ﬁrm at time 0. Therefore, private ﬁrms characterized
by very low beneﬁts of private control do not exist, and the fact that the post-IPO drop
would be low for such ﬁrms is nothing more than an intellectual curiosity.
In this section, we account for the endogeneity of the private ﬁrm’s existence by averaging
results across sets of parameters for which it is optimal to start a private ﬁrm at time 0.
The quantity whose average we calculate is the expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability. We
compute this expectation in closed form and analyze its dependence on the key parameters,
12Interestingly, uncertainty has an ambiguous eﬀect on the long-run expectation of ρt, which is equal to
E(b ρτ|b ρτ >ρ ). On one hand, lower uncertainty raises the IPO cutoﬀ ρ, which pushes E(b ρτ|b ρτ >ρ ) up. On
the other hand, for any given cutoﬀ, lower uncertainty pushes E(b ρτ|b ρτ >ρ ) down due to basic properties of
the truncated normal distribution (because the dispersion of b ρτ is smaller). The relative importance of the
two eﬀects depends on the sensitivity of ρ to uncertainty. In Figure 2, the second eﬀect prevails.
18uncertainty and volatility. The expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability is given by
Et [ρτ − b ρτ|IPO at τ]=Et
h
xτ|b ρτ >ρ(xτ; b στ,σ ρ)
i
, (32)
where xτ = ρτ − b ρτ and the IPO condition is from Corollary 2. Since xt mean-reverts around
zero, a positive expected value of xτ implies that xτ is expected to fall after the IPO, so that
ρτ is expected to fall toward the expectation of its long-run mean, b ρτ. We do not focus on
the expected percentage drop as in equation (10) because proﬁtability can be negative.
Proposition 4: At time t<τ, the expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability is given by
Et [ρτ − b ρτ|IPO at τ]=
e−φ(τ−t)xt −
R









where N (.) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution and
Φ(.;µx,σ2
x) is the probability density function of the normal distribution with mean µx and
variance σ2
x. The formulas for k (.), µx, and σ2
x are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 provides a closed-form expression for the expected post-IPO drop in prof-
itability. The expected drop depends mostly on uncertainty, volatility, and τ − t. Since this
dependence is too complicated to be characterized analytically, we examine it by computing
the expected drop as of time t = 0 for a wide range of parameter values. We vary uncertainty
b σ0 from 0 to 10% per year, and both components of volatility, σρ,1 = σρ,2, from 1% to 10%
per year. We average the results across a range of values for beneﬁts of private control, α,
and the prior mean, b ρ0 (because these two parameters seem the hardest to choose a priori).
We assume that α is uniformly distributed in [5%,15%] and b ρ0 is uniformly distributed in
[−20%,40%]. We take ρ0 = 0 and the remaining parameters are from Table 1. For each
set of parameters, we check whether the condition (29) is satisﬁed; if it is, we compute the
expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability following Proposition 4 with t = 0 and τ = 5. For
each combination of uncertainty and volatility, we average the expected drops across all
values of α and b ρ0 for which the condition (29) is satisﬁed. This calculation produces the
expected drop that accounts not only for the endogeneity of the IPO decision but also for
the endogeneity of the private ﬁrm’s existence and for uncertainty about α and b ρ0.
Table 2 shows the results. Almost all entries in Panel A are positive, conﬁrming that
the expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability is generally positive. The expected drop can be
as large as 23.5% per year, which obtains for b σ0 = 2% and σρ,1 = σρ,2 = 10%. However,
there exist parameter values for which the expected drop is zero or even slightly negative;
when proﬁtability exhibits very little volatility (σρ,1 = σρ,2 = 1%), we expect proﬁtability to
increase after the IPO, although only by less than 1%. The reason is that when volatility
is low, signals are precise, so learning is fast and b ρt rises rapidly toward the IPO cutoﬀ.
19Realized proﬁtability ρt, which is initiated at ρ0 = 0, may not “catch up” with b ρt, in which
case we have ρτ < b ρτ at time τ, after which we expect an increase in proﬁtability.
Panel A also shows that the expected drop in proﬁtability tends to be high when volatility
is high and when uncertainty is low, as expected from Sections 2. and 4.1. The volatility
pattern is stronger and it obtains even for b σ0 = 0 when the main force is mean reversion in
proﬁtability. Both eﬀects are non-monotonic, though. For example, when volatility increases
from 9% to 10%, the expected drop decreases in some cases, as it does when uncertainty
drops below 2%. This non-monotonicity is largely due to the endogeneity of the private ﬁrm’s
creation at time 0. For example, when uncertainty is higher, a private ﬁrm is less likely to be
created at time 0, at least according to the suﬃcient condition (Corollary 3). The ﬁrms that
are created tend to compensate for the higher uncertainty with higher values of α, for which
the drop is generally larger. This ﬁrm-selection eﬀect contributes to the reversal of the basic
pattern in Table 2 for the lowest values of b σ0. The ﬁrm-selection eﬀect is complicated, in part
because we do not have explicit comparative statics for the necessary and suﬃcient condition
(29); we can only partially characterize the suﬃcient condition (Corollary 3). Panel A of
Table 2 provides an imperfect but useful substitute for this intractable theoretical analysis.
The basic patterns in the table conﬁrm the implications of the toy model.
In addition to some sets of parameters being inadmissible due to failing the condition
(29), other sets of parameters seem implausible because they imply unrealistic properties
for the dynamics of the ﬁrm’s market value. To analyze these properties, Panel B of Table
2 reports the average volatility of the ﬁrm’s stock returns and Panel C reports the average
expected excess return on the ﬁrm’s stock. Both averages are computed as in Panel A,
across all admissible values of α and b ρ0, conditional on an IPO at time τ and also on
the creation of a private ﬁrm at time 0. Note that the expected excess return, which is
given by Q1(T − t)σρ,1σπ, does not depend on uncertainty. Panels B and C show that
many combinations of volatility and uncertainty in which volatility exceeds 3% produce
reasonable properties for stock returns, with return volatility ranging from 14% to 45% per
year and the expected excess return ranging from 5.9% to 14.8% per year. However, lower
values of the volatility of proﬁtability seem implausible. For example, for σρ,1 = σρ,2 = 1%,
return volatility ranges from only 3.5% to 6.6% and the expected excess return is only 1.5%.
These values seem unrealistically low, suggesting that proﬁtability must be more volatile
than σρ,1 = σρ,2 = 1% per year. Since the expected drop in Panel A is non-positive only
for the lowest values of the volatility of proﬁtability, this additional return-based evidence
strengthens the conclusion that the expected drop is positive in this model.
20Table 3 is a counterpart of Table 2 with τ = 5 replaced by τ =7 . 13 The results are quite
similar to those in Table 2. Although the expected drop is generally smaller than in Table
2, it is overwhelmingly positive. The only exceptions occur for the smallest values of the
volatility of proﬁtability, which seem implausible because they produce stock returns whose
volatility is less than 10% per year and whose mean is less than 3% in excess of the risk-free
rate. Although there are some non-monotonicities due to the private-ﬁrm selection at time
0, the expected drop generally increases with volatility and decreases with uncertainty.
5. Empirical Analysis
In this section we test the main predictions of our model: Firm proﬁtability drops after the
IPO on average, and this decline is larger for ﬁrms with more volatile proﬁtability and lower
uncertainty about average proﬁtability.
5.1. Data
Our data sources include CRSP, Compustat, IBES, SDC, and Jay Ritter’s IPO database.
Our sample contains 7,183 ﬁrms that had IPOs in the U.S. from 1975–2004. We include
an IPO ﬁrm in the sample if it meets all of the following criteria: (1) it appears in either
Jay Ritter’s 1975-1984 IPO database or in SDC’s U.S. Public Common Stock New Issues
database with an oﬀer date between 1/1/1985 and 12/31/2004; (2) it had a ﬁrm-commitment
IPO; (3) it is not a closed-end fund, trust, unit, ADR, ADS, or REIT; and (4) the IPO’s
oﬀer price was at least one dollar per share.
Guided by the model, we measure proﬁtability as earnings scaled by the book value of
equity, or return on equity (ROE). ROEi,s is computed for ﬁrm i in the ﬁscal quarter that is
s quarters after the IPO. The dependent variable in our tests is ROEi,s−ROEi,0, the change
in ROE over the ﬁrst s quarters after ﬁrm i’s IPO. ROE equals income before extraordinary
items available for common stock plus deferred taxes, divided by book equity. We calculate
earnings using quarterly Compustat data, and book value using both quarterly and annual
Compustat data. Further details on the construction of ROEi,s are in the Appendix.
We estimate the volatility of ROE by the standard deviation of quarterly ROE over a
ﬁve-year period after the IPO. Speciﬁcally, VO L (i;s0), or VO L (s0) for short, is the standard
deviation of ROEi,s in quarters s = s0,...,s0+19, assuming that at least 12 observations are
available. We use two values of s0. The natural choice is s0 = 0 because VO L (0) uses data as
13In the full sample of Loughran and Ritter (2004), the median ﬁrm age at the IPO is 7 years.
21close to the IPO as possible. Under this choice, some of the earnings data used to compute
VO L (0) are also used to compute the dependent variable, ROEi,s −ROEi,0. Although there
is no obvious bias, ﬁrms with large post-IPO increases or decreases in ROE are likely to have
large values of VO L (0). To address this concern, we also use s0 = s+1. There is no overlap
between the earnings data used to calculate VO L (s + 1) and ROEi,s − ROEi,0.
5.2. Separating Uncertainty from Volatility
To test the model’s prediction regarding uncertainty, we need a proxy. Commonly used prox-
ies for uncertainty such as ﬁrm age, size, return volatility, or analyst coverage are inadequate
here because they proxy not only for uncertainty but also for the volatility of proﬁtability,
which has an opposite theoretical eﬀect on the post-IPO drop in proﬁtability. In general,
ﬁrms with high uncertainty also tend to have high volatility, which presents an estimation
challenge. However, we have found an empirical proxy whose value should be high when
uncertainty is high and when volatility is low: the stock price reaction to post-IPO earnings
announcements. In fact, we can link this proxy directly to our model.
Corollary 4: If the model’s assumptions hold and, in addition, σρ,1 =0 , then




















The quantity M represents the stock price reaction to earnings surprises. M is positive
(i.e., earnings surprises and the associated abnormal returns have the same sign), increasing
in uncertainty (b σt), and decreasing in volatility (σρ,2). The intuition is clear. Realized
earnings are a noisy signal about average future proﬁtability. Upon observing a given signal,
investors update their beliefs about the ﬁrm value more when they are more uncertain and
when the signal is less noisy (i.e., when earnings are less volatile).
Our model predicts that ﬁrms with higher values of M have smaller post-IPO drops in
proﬁtability, because such ﬁrms have higher uncertainty, lower volatility, or both (holding
φ and t constant). Once we control for proﬁt volatility, the regression of ROEi,s − ROEi,0
on Mi can be interpreted as a test of the model’s prediction regarding uncertainty. The
theoretical motivation for M is only approximate because Corollary 4 requires σρ,1 =0 .
This assumption is unrealistic but its violation need not impair the usefulness of M by much
because we estimate M in short periods around ﬁrm-level earnings announcements, during
22which ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings news is likely to be the main driver of unexpected stock returns.
While we are aware that M is not a perfect proxy, we ﬁnd it satisfactory to use an empirical
proxy that is directly motivated by the theoretical model being tested.
We estimate Mi for each IPO ﬁrm i based on earnings announcement data. On the
left-hand side of equation (34), we interpret dRt − Et [dRt] as the abnormal return due to
an earnings announcement. We measure this quantity by ARit, the cumulative return of
stock i in excess of stock i’s industry’s return starting one trading day before the ﬁrm’s t-th
post-IPO earnings announcement and ending one trading day after the same announcement.
Quarterly earnings announcement dates are from IBES. Daily stock returns are from CRSP,
and daily returns of 49 value-weighted industry portfolios are from Ken French’s website.
On the right-hand side of equation (34), we interpret dρt − Et [dρt] as unexpected quarterly
proﬁtability, which we compute as (EPSit − E[EPSit]) /BEit. EPSit denotes the quarterly
earnings per share of ﬁrm i announced in its t-th post-IPO earnings announcement, from
the IBES unadjusted actuals ﬁle. E[EPSit] is the mean of all analyst forecasts of EPSit
using IBES’s last pre-announcement set of forecasts for the given ﬁscal quarter. BEit is book
equity per share of ﬁrm i, using the most recent pre-announcement measurement.
To estimate Mi, we compute two measures, ERC1(i) and ERC2(i), which we refer to as
the “earnings response” coeﬃcients, or ERCs. First, we compute
RCit =
ARit
(EPSit − E[ EPSit])/BEit
, (36)
excluding observations where the denominator equals zero. From equation (34), RCit is a
proxy for Mi. Since RCit is quite noisy (especially if the denominator is close to zero),
we winsorize the highest 5% and lowest 5% of RCit observations, and we also average the







We compute ERC1(i) only if there are at least six valid observations of RCit. To deﬁne
ERC2(i), consider the following regression over the ﬁve-year period after the IPO:
(EPSit − E[EPSit])/BEit = γi0 + γi1ARit + εit,t =0 ,1,...,20. (38)
According to equation (34), γi1 =1 /Mi but we do not measure Mi as 1/ˆ γi1 because ˆ γi1 can
be close to zero, producing outliers in 1/ˆ γi1. Instead, we deﬁne
ERC2(i)=−ˆ γi1, (39)
23with a minus sign so that large earnings responses are associated with large values of ERC2.
Unlike ERC1, ERC2 is not a direct estimate of M, but it preserves the same cross-sectional
ranking. We make earnings surprises the dependent variable in equation (38) to mitigate the
attenuation bias, since we believe there is more measurement error in earnings surprises than
in abnormal returns. Since equation (34) indicates γi0 = 0, we estimate the regressions in
(38) without the intercept. We require at least 10 observations to estimate these regressions.
Before running the regressions, we winsorize the highest and lowest 5% values of both ARit
and (EPSit − E[ EPSit])/BEit across all ﬁrms and quarters t =0 ,1,...,32. ERC2 is similar
to the earnings response coeﬃcient of Easton and Zmijewski (1989) and others.
5.3. Summary Statistics
Table 4 reports some summary statistics. The three-year change in ROE, ROEi,12−ROEi,0,
can be computed for 3,964 ﬁrms. The mean and median of ROEi,12 − ROEi,0 are both
negative, consistent with the model’s prediction. In addition, ROEi,12 − ROEi,0 is nega-
tively correlated with the volatility of ROE and positively correlated with the ERCs. These
correlations foreshadow our main empirical results.
Proﬁtability in the quarter of the IPO, ROEi,0, can be calculated for 5,795 of the 7,183
ﬁrms in our sample.14 The median ROEi,0 is 1.84% per quarter (or 7.4% per year), but
the mean is only -0.79%, indicating a left-skewed distribution of ROE. This left skewness
has been documented by Fama and French (2004) who attribute this pattern to small IPOs
that are highly unproﬁtable. The low ROEi,0 seems inconsistent with our model. In the
model, the realized ROE typically exceeds expected long-run ROE at the IPO (this is why
ROE declines after the IPO), so we would expect the ROE of IPOs to exceed the ROE of
comparable non-IPO ﬁrms. Supporting evidence is provided by Jain and Kini (1994) who
ﬁnd that when ﬁrms go public, they are more proﬁtable than the median ﬁrm in the same
industry. To reconcile Jain and Kini’s evidence with ours, note that their sample period
is 1976–1988, which is roughly the ﬁrst half of our sample (1975–2004). Fama and French
(2004) show that IPO proﬁtability declined in the 1990s. Indeed, in our sample, the medians
of ROEi,0 in three sub-periods, 1975–1984, 1985–1994, and 1995–2004, are 3.36%, 2.57%,
and 0.40%, respectively (the corresponding means are 2.24%, 0.23%, and -2.83%). The low
ROEi,0 in Table 4 is thus driven by the most recent sub-period, which was unusual in many
aspects. For example, in the late 1990s, ﬁrms went public at a younger age than ever before
(Loughran and Ritter, 2004). It is not surprising that such young ﬁrms are less proﬁtable
than the more mature ﬁrms that went public in the earlier decades.
14In contrast, ROE for the quarter immediately preceding the IPO quarter can be computed for only 31
ﬁrms, so we cannot test the model’s prediction that proﬁtability increases shortly before the IPO.
24Our model can be extended to accommodate the low ROEi,0 in the 1990s. The model
assumes that ROE mean-reverts around a constant mean ρ, but in reality, this mean is likely
to rise while the ﬁrm is very young. The start-up costs of a private ﬁrm often predictably
exceed revenues, making ROE mean-revert around a negative mean ρt for t close to zero.
Over time, ρt increases until it stabilizes as the ﬁrm matures. As long as the unknown value
of ρt varies deterministically, our basic mechanism works also in this extended model. An
IPO occurs if the perception of ρτ, b ρτ, is suﬃciently high. To push b ρτ up, realized proﬁts
must be higher than expected, which typically leads to ρτ > b ρτ, which in turn induces a
drop in ρt immediately after time τ. After the initial post-IPO decline, ρt either stabilizes or
rises, depending on the extent to which ρt rises after time τ. When τ is low, b ρτ is lower than
in our model and it can even be negative. As a result, ρτ = ROEi,0 can also be negative,
especially if τ (ﬁrm age at the IPO) is low, as it was in the late 1990s. To summarize, this
realistic extension of our model, in which ρt increases while the private ﬁrm is very young,
has the same basic implications while allowing ROEi,0 to be low and even negative.
Back to Table 4, ERC1 and ERC2 can be computed for almost 40% of ﬁrms. (IBES
coverage begins in 1982 and is poor for most of the 1980s.) The mean of ERC1 shows that
a 1% earnings surprise (scaled by book equity) is associated with a 3.13% abnormal stock
return, on average. Theoretically, earnings surprises and stock returns should have the same
sign, so ERC1 should be positive and ERC2 negative. However, ERC1 is negative for 33%
of ﬁrms, and ERC2 is positive for 22% of ﬁrms. These unexpected signs are probably due to
measurement error in expected earnings and non-earnings related news. The cross-sectional
means of ERC1 and ERC2 do have the predicted signs and high statistical signiﬁcance.
Since ERC1 and ERC2 proxy for uncertainty divided by volatility, we expect them to be
negatively correlated with the volatility of ROE, and they indeed are. However, ERC1
and ERC2 are almost uncorrelated with each other. This unexpected result is due to the
observations of ERC1 and ERC2 that do not have the predicted signs (i.e., ERC1 < 0 and





2 in the same way as ERC1 and ERC2, except we delete observations with





Figure 3 plots the change in ROE, ROEi,s − ROEi,0, in event time following the IPO.
The top panel shows that average ROE drops steadily after the IPO, leveling oﬀ after about
eight quarters. The median change in ROE, plotted in the middle panel, is also negative but
15Under the assumptions that deliver equation (34), ERC1 and ERC2 are approximate estimates of M
and −1/M, respectively, so ERC2 ≈− 1/ERC1. The function f(x)=−1/x is monotonically increasing for
x>0 (which is the predicted sign of ERC1), making x and f(x) perfectly positively correlated, but the
presence of negative values of x (i.e., values of ERC1 with unpredicted signs) destroys this relation since we
observe both branches of the hyperbola instead of just the branch with x>0 and f(x) < 0.
25smaller in magnitude than the mean change. The 75th percentile line shows that for more
than a quarter of ﬁrms, ROE actually increases following the IPO. This is not inconsistent
with the model, which makes predictions only about the average post-IPO change in ROE.
The bottom panel shows the mean change in ROE in the sub-samples of ﬁrms that had IPOs
in 1975–1984, 1985–1994, and 1995–2004. The patterns are remarkably similar across the
three sub-samples, and they are also similar to the model-implied pattern in Figure 1.
Figure 4 compares the post-IPO average changes in ROE between ﬁrms with high and
low values of volatility and the ERCs. We split all ﬁrms into two equally large sub-samples
based on whether the ﬁrms’ VO L (0) is larger or smaller than the cross-sectional median of
VO L (0), and we do the same for ERC1. (The results based on VO L (13) and ERC2 lead
to the same conclusions.) We calculate each sub-sample’s mean change in ROE at various
horizons. We plot these changes in Panels A and B and we also plot their diﬀerences,
along with 95% conﬁdence intervals, in Panels C and D. Panels A and C show that mean
proﬁtability drops for both high- and low-VO L (0) ﬁrms, the drop is signiﬁcantly larger for
ﬁrms with high VO L (0), and the diﬀerence grows with the horizon. Similarly, Panels B and
D show that mean proﬁtability drops for both high- and low-ERC1 ﬁrms, the drop is larger
for low-ERC1 ﬁrms, and the diﬀerence generally grows with the horizon. Both results are
consistent with the model. However, since ERC1 depends on both uncertainty and volatility,
it is unclear which of the two variables drives the diﬀerence between the high- and low-ERC1
ﬁrms. In the following section, we attempt to disentangle these eﬀects by including both
volatility and the ERCs in a multiple regression.
5.4. Regression Analysis
We estimate the following regression across all IPO ﬁrms with available data:
ROEi,s − ROEi,0 = Xiβ + εi, (40)
where the vector Xi contains a constant and various combinations of our measures of ROE
volatility and earnings response. We consider two horizons, s = 4 and s = 12 quarters. In
each speciﬁcation, we use as many observations as possible, so the sample is not necessarily
the same across speciﬁcations. We estimate β by ordinary least squares and calculate its
standard error by clustering the regression residuals in calendar time.16
Table 5 shows the results. First, we estimate the unconditional mean change in ROE over
16We allow non-zero correlations between the residuals of ﬁrms whose IPOs were s/2 or fewer quarters
apart in calendar time. Speciﬁcally, we assume that E[εiεj] is equal to σ2 for i = j and to σ2
t for i 6= j,
where t is the number of quarters between i and j’s IPOs. For t ≤ s/2, we estimate σ2
t from the relevant
subset of the estimated OLS residuals; for t>s / 2, we set σ2
t =0 .
26the ﬁrst 4 and 12 post-IPO quarters, respectively. The average value of ROEi,4 − ROEi,0
is -2.68% per quarter (t = −11.2) and the average value of ROEi,12 − ROEi,0 is -4.29% per
quarter (t = −16.2). On average, ﬁrm proﬁtability clearly drops after the IPO, consistent
with the model and also with the earlier empirical studies.
Second, we test the model’s prediction that ROE drops more for ﬁrms with more volatile
ROE. Indeed, the slope coeﬃcients on both VO L (0) and VO L (s+1) are negative and highly
statistically signiﬁcant, with t-statistics exceeding7.4 in absolute value at both horizons. The
relation is also economically signiﬁcant: a one-standard-deviation cross-sectional increase in
VO L (0) is associated with a 1.74% per quarter larger four-quarter drop in ROE and a 5.01%
per quarter larger twelve-quarter drop in ROE (not tabulated). The corresponding numbers
for VO L (s + 1) are 1.48% and 1.88% per quarter, respectively.
Third, we test the prediction that ROE drops more for ﬁrms with smaller earnings re-
sponse measures. Indeed, we observe positive slope coeﬃcients on ERC1 and ERC2 in all
four speciﬁcations (two horizons, two ERCs), and three of the four coeﬃcients are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. A one-standard-deviation decrease in ERC1 is associated with a 0.69% per
quarter larger four-quarter drop in ROE and a 0.97% larger twelve-quarter drop in ROE.
The corresponding numbers for ERC2 are 0.20% and 0.58%, respectively.
Fourth, since ﬁrms with smaller ERC1 and ERC2 should have either lower uncertainty
or higher volatility or both, we attempt to isolate the impact of uncertainty by including
controls for volatility. In these multiple regressions, the slope coeﬃcients on volatility remain
negative and highly signiﬁcant. The slope coeﬃcients on ERC1 and ERC2 are positive in
all eight speciﬁcations (two horizons, two ERCs, two volatility measures), but only three of
these coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, and barely so. These results are consistent with
the model’s uncertainty prediction, but the evidence is not overwhelming.
The ERCs may contain substantial estimation error due to mismeasurement of investors’
earnings expectations and to non-earnings-related news. This error is likely to aﬀect espe-
cially the coeﬃcient estimates that do not have the predicted signs (i.e., ERC1 < 0 and
ERC2 > 0); in fact, this error is the most likely reason why these signs are opposite to what
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results show that ROE drops more for ﬁrms with smaller ERCs, and the evidence is even




2 are signiﬁcantly positive
27in all four univariate speciﬁcations, with t-statistics ranging from 2.30 to 6.68. Second,





2 are positive in all speciﬁcations, and ﬁve of the eight coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcant. These results are stronger than in Table 5; for example, the t-
statistic for ERC2 in the last speciﬁcation increases from 1.97 in Table 5 to 4.77 in Table 6.17
This increase in signiﬁcance suggests that the decrease in precision resulting from a smaller
number of observations is more than oﬀset by the increase in precision resulting from using
the ERCs that contain less measurement error. These results support the model’s prediction
that the post-IPO drop in ROE should be larger for ﬁrms with less uncertainty.
We conduct additional robustness tests. First, it makes little diﬀerence whether we use
the median instead of the mean of analyst forecasts when estimating E[EPSit], or whether
we require at least two forecasts to compute the mean. Second, changing the number of
post-IPO quarters over which ERC1 and ERC2 are computed leads to similar results. The
tradeoﬀ is that as we use more quarters, the ERCs become less noisy but we also lose
more observations and we need to assume that observations several years after the IPO are
equally informative about uncertainty and volatility at the time of the IPO. Third, changing
the horizon over which we measure the post-IPO drop in ROE to two years or four years
does not change any of our conclusions. Fourth, we obtain very similar results when we free
up the intercept in the regression (38) used to estimate ERC2, and also when we redeﬁne
ERC2 as the slope in the reverse regression of abnormal returns on earnings surprises. Fifth,
in the regression used to calculate ERC2, we include an additional regressor, the cumulative
stock return starting one day after IBES records the analyst forecasts and ending two trading
days before the earnings announcement. The idea is to soak up some of the news that comes
out before the earnings announcement but after analysts form their forecasts (about two
weeks earlier, on average). The resulting modiﬁcation of ERC2 enters our regressions with
the same sign but slightly lower statistical signiﬁcance than the original ERC2. However,
the modiﬁed ERC2 has the predicted sign less often than the original ERC2, so including
the additional regressor seems to reduce rather than increase precision. Sixth, controlling
for ﬁrm-level sample estimates of the mean reversion coeﬃcient φ leads to exactly the same
conclusions. Overall, our empirical evidence seems reasonably robust.
17We obtain similar results when we winsorize the ERCs with unpredicted signs at zero instead of elimi-
nating them. The slope coeﬃcients on the ERCs are signiﬁcantly positive in all four univariate speciﬁcations,
and they are also positive in all eight speciﬁcations that control for the volatility of ROE, with four of the
eight coeﬃcients being statistically signiﬁcant.
286. Conclusions
This paper develops a model of the optimal IPO decision, analyzes the model’s novel pre-
dictions, and tests these predictions empirically. In the model, two types of agents, well-
diversiﬁed investors and an under-diversiﬁed entrepreneur, both learn about the average
proﬁtability of a private ﬁrm by observing realized proﬁts. There is no asymmetric informa-
tion. The entrepreneur making the IPO decision faces a tradeoﬀ between beneﬁts of private
control and diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of going public. It is optimal for the entrepreneur to take
his ﬁrm public if the ﬁrm’s market value exceeds the ﬁrm’s private value. We show that an
IPO takes place if the agents learn that the ﬁrm’s average proﬁtability is suﬃciently high.
The model predicts that ﬁrm proﬁtability should decline after the IPO, on average, and that
this decline should be larger for ﬁrms with more volatile proﬁtability and ﬁrms with less
uncertain average proﬁtability. We test these predictions empirically and ﬁnd signiﬁcant
support for them in the data. High volatility and high uncertainty tend to go together, but
we separate them by estimating the stock price reaction to earnings announcements, which
should be strong when uncertainty is high and when volatility is low.
In the model, IPO ﬁrms cannot return to private ownership, but the model’s logic seems
relevant for the going private decision (e.g., Zingales, 1995, Benninga et al, 2005, Bharath
and Dittmar, 2006). Reversing our arguments for going public, a ﬁrm is taken private if
the beneﬁts of private control exceed the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of public ownership, which
happens when the agents learn that average proﬁtability is suﬃcientlylow. Such an extension
of our model would predict that ﬁrms tend to experience declines in proﬁtability before going
private and increases in proﬁtability after going private. Consistent with the ﬁrst prediction,
Halpern et al (1999) ﬁnd that stock returns before leveraged buyouts are unusually low. We
leave this model extension as well as its empirical testing for future research.
There is no role for venture capitalists (VCs) in our simple model. It would be interesting
to add VCs to the model and analyze their eﬀect on the IPO decision. Lerner (1994) is an
early empirical study on the eﬀect of VCs on the IPO timing. A simpler way to extend
the model is to relax the assumption that the time of the IPO decision is given. This
extension can be solved numerically in a way analogous to solving for the optimal time to
exercise an American option. (P´ astor and Veronesi (2005) follow this route in a related
framework in their analysis of IPO waves.) The key implications of the model are preserved
in that (more complex) framework. The entrepreneur chooses to go public immediately
after expected proﬁtability exceeds a cutoﬀ, which happens after unexpected increases in
proﬁtability. Proﬁtability is expected to decline after the IPO due to the same eﬀects of
learning and mean reversion that we describe here. This extension also generates IPO waves
29among ﬁrms in industries that recently became more proﬁtable, as well as industry-wide
post-wave declines in proﬁtability. We do not pursue this extension formally because our
focus is on learning whose implications come through also in the simpler model.
Our model assumes that the entrepreneur sells the entire private ﬁrm in an IPO. It would
be interesting to extend the model to allow the entrepreneur to sell only a fraction of the
ﬁrm. Such a model might allow one to solve for the optimal fraction to be sold in an IPO,
and to relate this fraction to the ﬁrm’s characteristics and to its post-IPO performance.
Although our model is designed for IPOs, it has some relevance for seasoned equity
oﬀerings (SEO) as well. If a shareholder owns a substantial fraction of a ﬁrm’s shares,
she faces a similar tradeoﬀ as our entrepreneur: issuing equity makes the shareholder more
diversiﬁed while reducing her control over the ﬁrm. Following the logic of the model, the
shareholder may ﬁnd it optimal to issue more equity after a suﬃciently large improvement
in proﬁtability and, as a result, proﬁtability should subsequently fall for the same reasons
as in the model. Indeed, Loughran and Ritter (1997) ﬁnd that ﬁrm proﬁtability tends to
increase before an SEO and decline thereafter, exactly as the model would imply. It would be
interesting to test whether this pattern in proﬁtability around SEOs is related to volatility,
uncertainty, and to the fraction of equity held by the ﬁrm’s largest shareholder.
Loughran and Ritter (1997) also argue that “The most salient feature concerning ﬁrms’
equity issuance behavior is that most ﬁrms issue equity after large stock price increases.”
For example, Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) report that ﬁrms
engaging in SEOs tend to exhibit high stock returns prior to the SEO. This empirical fact
is also consistent with our model. In the model, an issue of equity is induced by recent
unexpected increases in proﬁtability, which should coincide with high stock returns. We
cannot test this prediction on IPOs since pre-IPO stock returns are obviously unavailable, but
the SEO evidence seems comforting. Also note that our model makes no unusual predictions
regarding the post-issue stock returns, which are actively debated in the literature.18 We
have nothing to add to this debate. In our model, expected stock returns are not anomalous;
they are determined by the covariances between returns and the stochastic discount factor.
We analyze operating performance rather than stock performance.
18For example, Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that stock returns of ﬁrms that recently
went public are lower on average than returns of seasoned ﬁrms, while Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav,
G´ eczy, and Gompers (2000) argue that most IPOs are small growth stocks and such stocks have had low
returns regardless of whether they recently went public. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) ﬁnd that after
they go public, reverse LBOs actually have slightly higher stock returns than comparison ﬁrms.
30Appendix.
Detailed Deﬁnitions of the Empirical Measures.
Proﬁtability, ROEis, equals [Iis + DTis]/BEis. The subscript s denotes the s-th ﬁscal
quarter after the ﬁscal quarter of ﬁrm i’s IPO. The ﬁscal quarter containing the IPO is
quarter zero. Iis equals the income before extraordinary items available for common stock
(Compustat quarterly item 25) for ﬁrm i in quarter s. DTis equals deferred taxes from
income account (Compustat quarterly item 35); we impute a zero value if this item is missing.
BEis is the book value of equity of ﬁrm i in quarter s. BEis is calculated either from the
previous ﬁscal quarter, previous ﬁscal year, current ﬁscal quarter, or current ﬁscal year,
taken in that order depending on availability. Following Fama and French (1993), book
value of equity equals stockholders’ equity plus deferred taxes minus book value of preferred
stock. If any of these three items is missing, then book value of equity is treated as missing.
We treat negative or zero values of BE as missing. Stockholders’ equity equals either “total
stockholders’ equity” (quarterly item 60, annual item 216), “total common equity” (quarterly
item 59, annual item 60) + “carrying value of preferred stock” (quarterly item 55, annual
item 130), “total assets” (quarterly item 44, annual item 6) - “total liabilities” (quarterly
item 54, annual item 181), or missing, in that order depending on availability. Deferred taxes
equals “deferred tax and investment tax credit” (quarterly item 52, annual item 35), or if
that is missing, then zero. Annual book value of preferred stock equals either “redemption
value of preferred stock” (annual item 56), “liquidating value of preferred stock” (annual item
10), “carrying value of preferred stock” (annual 130), or zero, in that order depending on
availability. Quarterly book value of preferred stock equals “book value of preferred stock”
(quarterly item 55), or zero if item 55 is missing. We eliminate ﬁrm-quarter observations
where ROEis is outside [-100%, +100%].
Abnormal stock return, ARit, is the cumulative return of stock i in excess of stock i’s in-
dustry, starting one day before the stock’s t-th post-IPO earnings announcement and ending
one day after the same announcement. Since the industry portfolios were constructed using
Compustat SIC codes, we link ﬁrms to industries using the most recent annual Compustat
SIC code (item 324), soonest future Compustat annual SIC code, most recent CRSP SIC
code (SICCD), or soonest future CRSP SIC code, in that order depending on availability.
Earnings announcement date is variable REPDATS from the IBES unadjusted actuals ﬁle.
Earnings per share, EPSit, is the quarterly EPS of ﬁrm i announced in its t-th post-IPO
earnings announcement (variable VALUE in the IBES unadjusted actuals ﬁle). E[EPSit]
is the mean of all analyst forecasts of EPSit using IBES’s last pre-announcement set of fore-
casts for the given ﬁscal quarter (variable MEANEST in the IBES unadjusted summary ﬁle).
We eliminate observations for which the earnings announcement date is more than 60 days
after the most recent set of earnings forecasts (roughly 1% of observations are eliminated).
31Theoretical Results.
This appendix contains the formulas that we refer to in the text. The proofs of all propo-
sitions are contained in the Technical Appendix that is available on the authors’ websites.






































Proposition 3: An IPO takes place if and only if condition (25) is satisﬁed, where
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b Q0 (u − τ;T)=Q0 (u − τ) − Q0 (T − τ)
b Q1 (u − τ;T)=Q1 (u − τ) − Q1 (T − τ) < 0
b Q2 (u − τ;T)=Q2 (u − τ) − Q2 (T − τ) < 0
b Q3 (u − τ;T)=Q2 (u − τ)
2 − Q2(T − τ)
2 < 0
IPO decision: An IPO takes place if and only if condition (26) holds, where
Z (xτ, b ρτ, b στ,u− τ,T)=e




Proposition 4: The expected drop in proﬁtability is given in equation (33), where
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and Gi(τ,u), i =0 ,..,3, G0(τ,u), and a2(τ,u) are given in the Technical Appendix.































































Panel B.   Realized and expected profitability,     ρ
0 = 0 
Realized Profitability
Expected Average Profitability
Figure 1. Model-Implied Expected and Realized Proﬁtability Around an IPO.
This ﬁgure plots the average paths of realized proﬁtability (ρt; solid line) and expected
average proﬁtability (b ρt; dashed line), in percent per year, where the paths are averaged
across 10,000 simulations of our model in which an IPO takes place at time τ = 5. Given
the large number of simulations, these average paths represent expected patterns in ρt and
b ρt conditional on an IPO. In Panel A, the initial proﬁtability ρ0 = b ρ0 = 7%; in Panel B,
ρ0 = 0. The remaining model parameters are from Table 1.






































Higher Volatility of Profitability
Higher Benefits of Private Control




























Panel B.   Realized profitability paths,   ρ
0 = 0 
Base Case
Lower Uncertainty
Higher Volatility of Profitability
Higher Benefits of Private Control
Figure 2. Model-Implied Realized Proﬁtability Around an IPO. This ﬁgure plots
the average paths of realized proﬁtability, ρt, in percent per year, where the average is
computed across 10,000 simulations of our model in which an IPO takes place at time τ =5 .
Given the large number of simulations, these average paths represent expected patterns in
ρt conditional on an IPO. In Panel A, the initial proﬁtability ρ0 = b ρ0 = 7%; in Panel B,
ρ0 = 0. The solid line corresponds to the baseline case, in which the model parameters are
from Table 1. The other lines correspond to one-parameter deviations from Table 1: private
beneﬁts are increased to α =0 .11 (dashed-dot line), uncertainty is reduced to b σ0 =0 .04
(dotted line), and volatility of proﬁtability is increased to σρ,1 = σρ,2 =0 .065 (dashed line).
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Figure 3. Post-IPO Changes in Proﬁtability. This ﬁgure plots the post-IPO changes
in ﬁrm proﬁtability, measured as return on equity (ROE), for our sample of 7,183 IPOs in
the U.S. from 1975–2004. Time 0 is the quarter of the IPO. ROEi,s is ﬁrm i’s proﬁtability
s quarters after its IPO, in percent per quarter. The top panel plots the equal-weighted
average of ROEi,s − ROEi,0 across all ﬁrms for which both ROEi,s and ROEi,0 can be
computed (solid line), as well as the 95% conﬁdence interval for the mean (dashed lines).
The middle panel plots the median value of ROEi,s −ROEi,0 (solid line), as well as the 25th
and 75th percentiles (dashed lines). The bottom panel plots the equal-weighted average of
ROEi,s − ROEi,0 across IPOs in three sub-samples: 1975–1984, 1985–1994, and 1995–2004.
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Figure 4. Post-IPO Changes in Proﬁtability: Volatility vs. Uncertainty. We split
our sample of 7,183 IPOs in 1975–2004 into high-volatility IPOs and low-volatility IPOs, and
also into high-ERC1 IPOs and low-ERC1 IPOs. The left-hand panels split the sample using
the median of VO L (0), 5.28% per quarter. The right-hand panels split the sample using
the median of ERC1, 2.19. ERC1 measures ﬁrm i’s average stock price reaction to earnings
surprises; ROEi,s is ﬁrm i’s proﬁtability s quarters after its IPO, in percent per quarter;
and VO L (0) is the standard deviation of ROEi,s for s =0 ,...,19 quarters. Time 0 is the
quarter of the IPO. Panels A and B plot the means of ROEi,s − ROEi,0 across the ﬁrms in
the respective sub-samples split by volatility (Panel A) and ERC1 (Panel B). Panel C plots
the low volatility sub-sample’s mean ROEi,s −ROEi,0 minus the high volatility sub-sample’s
mean ROEi,s − ROEi,0. Panel D plots the high ERC1 sub-sample’s mean ROEi,s − ROEi,0
minus the low ERC1 sub-sample’s mean ROEi,s −ROEi,0. The dashed lines denote the 95%
conﬁdence interval for this diﬀerence in diﬀerences.
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Parameter Values used in Simulations
This table contains the baseline parameter values used in simulations from the model. T is the time until
the patent expiration, τ is the time until the IPO decision, r is the risk-free rate, σπ determines the volatility
of the stochastic discount factor, σρ,1 is systematic volatility of proﬁtability, σρ,2 is idiosyncratic volatility
of proﬁtability, φ is the mean reversion coeﬃcient for proﬁtability, b ρ0 is the prior mean of ρ, b σ0 is the prior
standard deviation of ρ, α captures the entrepreneur’s consumption due to private control, γ denotes risk
aversion, η determines the relative importance of terminal wealth in the entrepreneur’s utility function, and
β is the entrepreneur’s subjective discount rate. All values are expressed in annual terms.
Tτ r σ π σρ,1 σρ,2 φ b ρ0 b σ0 αγηβ
15 5 0.03 0.60 0.0584 0.0596 0.3968 0.07 0.05 0.10 2 1 0.03
38Table 2
The Average Expected Post-IPO Drop in Proﬁtability (τ =5 )
Panel A shows the average expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability, computed at time 0 conditional on an
IPO at time τ = 5. Panel B shows the average volatility of the ﬁrm’s stock returns, and Panel C reports
the average expected excess return on the ﬁrm’s stock. For any given combination of prior uncertainty, b σ0,
and the volatility of proﬁtability, σρ,1 = σρ,2, all three averages are computed across all admissible values
of beneﬁts of private control, α, and the prior mean, b ρ0. The admissible values of α and b ρ0 are subsets of
the intervals [5%,15%] and [−20%,40%], respectively, that include only the sets of parameters for which the
condition (29) is satisﬁed. The initial proﬁtability is ρ0 = 0 and all remaining parameters are in Table 1.
σρ,1 = σρ,2 (% per year)
123456789 1 0
Panel A: Average Expected Drop in Proﬁtability (% per year).
0 0.28 0.64 2.78 4.82 6.26 7.97 10.44 16.20 17.46 21.78
1 -0.01 1.87 3.89 4.87 6.83 8.02 12.50 16.77 19.77 22.02
2 -0.22 1.13 3.58 6.78 10.88 11.53 15.92 19.29 22.73 23.49
3 -0.55 1.13 3.44 5.10 8.45 10.58 15.24 16.37 21.68 20.55
b σ0 4 -0.78 0.30 2.15 3.34 5.97 8.94 12.19 15.19 19.05 21.25
5 -0.99 -0.12 1.17 2.78 4.61 7.12 9.67 13.86 14.29 18.94
(% p.a.) 6 - -0.63 0.52 2.14 4.13 6.44 8.43 10.57 12.23 13.34
7 - -0.92 0.11 1.70 3.89 5.18 7.17 9.15 11.99 10.74
8 - - -0.24 1.12 3.00 5.37 8.59 9.29 8.95 10.42
9 - - - - 2.27 4.12 6.76 - - -
1 0 ----------
Panel B: Average Stock Return Volatility (% per year).
0 3.50 6.99 10.49 13.99 17.48 20.98 24.48 27.97 31.47 34.97
1 4.83 7.92 11.16 14.50 17.90 21.33 24.78 28.24 31.70 35.18
2 5.90 9.65 12.75 15.85 19.04 22.31 25.64 29.00 32.39 35.79
3 6.30 10.97 14.48 17.59 20.66 23.77 26.95 30.19 33.47 36.78
4 6.48 11.79 15.89 19.30 22.43 25.50 28.58 31.70 34.87 38.09
b σ0 5 6.57 12.29 16.94 20.77 24.13 27.27 30.34 33.40 36.50 39.62
6 - 12.61 17.69 21.95 25.62 28.95 32.10 35.18 38.24 41.32
(% p.a.) 7 - 12.81 18.22 22.87 26.88 30.47 33.78 36.94 40.02 43.09
8 - - 18.62 23.58 27.93 31.79 35.31 38.60 41.77 44.86
9 - - - - 28.78 32.92 36.67 - - -
1 0 ----------
Panel C: Average Expected Excess Stock Return (% per year).
Any b σ0 1.48 2.97 4.45 5.93 7.42 8.90 10.38 11.87 13.35 14.84
39Table 3
The Average Expected Post-IPO Drop in Proﬁtability (τ =7 )
Panel A shows the average expected post-IPO drop in proﬁtability, computed at time 0 conditional on an
IPO at time τ = 7. Panel B shows the average volatility of the ﬁrm’s stock returns, and Panel C reports
the average expected excess return on the ﬁrm’s stock. For any given combination of prior uncertainty, b σ0,
and the volatility of proﬁtability, σρ,1 = σρ,2, all three averages are computed across all admissible values
of beneﬁts of private control, α, and the prior mean, b ρ0. The admissible values of α and b ρ0 are subsets of
the intervals [5%,15%] and [−20%,40%], respectively, that include only the sets of parameters for which the
condition (29) is satisﬁed. The initial proﬁtability is ρ0 = 0 and all remaining parameters are in Table 1.
σρ,1 = σρ,2 (% per year)
123456789 1 0
Panel A: Average Expected Drop in Proﬁtability (% per year).
0 0.09 1.14 2.94 5.15 6.87 9.24 10.78 13.25 13.69 12.92
1 -0.15 0.62 2.34 4.61 6.39 8.72 10.42 12.82 14.77 12.78
2 -0.01 1.42 2.57 3.96 6.01 7.39 9.26 11.74 13.81 13.40
3 -0.14 0.85 2.03 4.17 4.83 6.32 9.16 9.94 13.59 12.27
b σ0 4 -0.22 0.46 1.73 2.27 4.04 5.91 8.03 9.16 12.87 14.71
5 -0.28 0.30 1.13 2.27 3.57 5.25 6.95 10.05 10.37 14.09
(% p.a.) 6 - 0.00 0.80 1.95 3.61 5.33 6.82 8.30 9.51 10.38
7 - -0.10 0.63 1.87 3.60 4.76 7.04 7.95 10.29 9.04
8 - - 0.52 1.57 3.12 5.09 7.93 8.61 8.47 10.50
9 - - - - 2.70 4.20 6.57 - - -
1 0 ----------
Panel B: Average Stock Return Volatility (% per year).
0 3.42 6.83 10.25 13.66 17.08 20.49 23.91 27.32 30.74 34.15
1 4.23 7.47 10.72 14.03 17.38 20.75 24.12 27.51 30.91 34.31
2 4.72 8.45 11.73 14.94 18.17 21.44 24.74 28.06 31.40 34.76
3 4.88 9.09 12.68 15.99 19.20 22.41 25.64 28.89 32.16 35.46
4 4.95 9.44 13.37 16.91 20.23 23.46 26.67 29.88 33.10 36.34
b σ0 5 4.98 9.64 13.84 17.63 21.13 24.47 27.72 30.93 34.14 37.35
6 - 9.76 14.16 18.17 21.88 25.36 28.71 31.97 35.19 38.40
(% p.a.) 7 - 9.84 14.37 18.57 22.47 26.12 29.59 32.94 36.22 39.45
8 - - 14.53 18.87 22.93 26.74 30.35 33.81 37.17 40.46
9 - - - - 23.30 27.26 31.00 - - -
1 0 ----------
Panel C: Average Expected Excess Stock Return (% per year).
Any b σ0 1.45 2.90 4.35 5.80 7.24 8.69 10.14 11.59 13.04 14.49
40Table 4
Summary Statistics for the IPO Sample
Panel A contains summary statistics (means, standard deviations, percentiles) for the 7,183 ﬁrms in our
sample of IPOs from 1975-2004. N is the number of ﬁrms for which the given variable can be calculated.
t-stat is the t-statistic testing the hypothesis that the mean of the given variable is equal to zero. ROEi,s is
the return on equity of ﬁrm i computed s quarters after the ﬁrm’s IPO, in percent per quarter. VO L (s0)
is the standard deviation of ROEi,s for s = s0,...,s 0 + 19. ERC1 is the average of the ﬁrst 12 post-IPO
stock price reactions to earnings surprises. ERC
+
1 is equal to ERC1 when ERC1 > 0 and missing otherwise.
ERC2 is the negative of the regression slope of earnings surprises on abnormal stock returns using ﬁrm i’s
ﬁrst 20 post-IPO quarters of earnings surprises. ERC−
2 is equal to ERC2 when ERC2 < 0 and missing
otherwise. Panel B shows pairwise correlations computed across ﬁrms.
Panel A. Summary Statistics.
Percentiles
Variable N Mean Std. dev. t-stat 25th 50th 75th
ROEi,0 5,795 -0.79 12.57 -4.8 -3.81 1.84 4.62
ROEi,12 − ROEi,0 3,964 -4.29 15.56 -17.4 -6.85 -1.51 1.48
VO L (0) 4,546 8.03 7.45 72.7 2.52 5.28 11.11
VO L (13) 2,606 7.65 7.74 50.5 2.30 4.61 10.35
ERC1 2,773 3.13 6.86 24.1 -1.06 2.19 6.79
ERC2 2,588 -0.035 0.067 -26.7 -0.064 -0.026 -0.002
ERC
+
1 1,855 6.46 5.59 49.8 2.16 5.17 9.00
ERC
−
2 2,007 -0.056 0.056 -44.7 -0.078 -0.040 -0.018
Panel B. Cross-Sectional Correlations.
ROEi,12





ROEi,12 − ROEi,0 1.00
VO L (0) -0.33 1.00
VO L (13) -0.15 0.65 1.00
ERC1 0.07 -0.16 -0.11 1.00
ERC2 0.04 -0.14 -0.06 -0.05 1.00
ERC
+
1 0.08 -0.25 -0.14 1.00 0.14 1.00
ERC
−
2 0.16 -0.31 -0.18 0.16 1.00 0.30 1.00
41Table 5
Cross-Sectional Regressions
This table reports OLS estimates of β from the model ROEi,s − ROEi,0 = βXi + ￿i. The sample contains
7,183 IPO ﬁrms from 1975-2004 less any ﬁrms for which at least one variable is missing, for a total of N
ﬁrms. ROEi,s is the return on equity of ﬁrm i computed s quarters after the ﬁrm’s IPO, in percent per
quarter. Xi contains combinations of the following variables: a constant, VOL (s0) (the standard deviation
of ROEi,s for s = s0,...,s 0 + 19), ERC1 (the average of ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst 12 post-IPO stock price reactions to
earnings surprises), and ERC2 (minus the regression slope of ﬁrm i’s earnings surprises on ﬁrm i’s abnormal
stock returns around earnings announcements). The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed by
clustering the error terms in calendar time.
Panel A. One-Year Horizon. (Regressand: ROEi,4 − ROEi,0)
Constant -2.68 0.48 0.35 -1.33 -0.44 0.38 0.54 0.51 0.58
(-11.2) (1.65) (1.31) (-4.08) (-1.49) (0.97) (1.52) (1.34) (1.74)
VO L (0) -0.238 -0.186 -0.163
(-10.8) (-5.93) (-5.00)
VO L (5) -0.198 -0.177 -0.123
(-9.04) (-5.64) (-3.89)
ERC1 0.100 0.063 0.028
(3.35) (2.08) (0.88)
ERC2 3.05 1.30 6.58
(1.04) (0.44) (2.10)
R2 0.000 0.028 0.024 0.004 0.000 0.021 0.012 0.019 0.011
N 5,340 4,124 3,353 2,526 2,373 2,211 2,301 1,816 1,978
Panel B. Three-Year Horizon. (Regressand: ROEi,12 − ROEi,0)
Constant -4.29 1.20 -0.70 -4.32 -2.76 1.71 1.20 -0.99 -0.41
(-16.2) (3.86) (-2.01) (-9.66) (-7.36) (2.97) (2.63) (-2.09) (-0.83)
VO L (0) -0.708 -0.820 -0.659
(-21.8) (-17.8) (-14.8)
VO L (13) -0.248 -0.268 -0.230
(-7.48) (-6.11) (-5.31)
ERC1 0.144 0.020 0.060
(3.05) (0.46) (1.32)
ERC2 8.71 1.57 8.67
(2.04) (0.38) (1.97)
R2 0.000 0.108 0.024 0.004 0.002 0.140 0.092 0.033 0.024
N 3,964 3,940 2,312 2,121 2,239 2,118 2,238 1,224 1,379
42Table 6
Cross-Sectional Regressions, Excluding ERCs with Unpredicted Signs
This table reports OLS estimates of β from the model ROEi,s − ROEi,0 = βsXi + ￿i. The sample contains
7,183 IPO ﬁrms from 1975-2004 less any ﬁrms for which at least one variable is missing, for a total of N
ﬁrms. ROEi,s is the return on equity of ﬁrm i computed s quarters after the ﬁrm’s IPO, in percent per
quarter. Xi contains combinations of the following variables: a constant, VOL (s0) (the standard deviation
of ROEi,s for s = s0,...,s 0 + 19), ERC
+
1 (the average of ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst 12 post-IPO stock price reactions to
earnings surprises, excluding negative values), and ERC
−
2 (minus the regression slope of ﬁrm i’s earnings
surprises on ﬁrm i’s abnormal stock returns around earnings announcements, excluding positive values). The
t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed by clustering the error terms in calendar time.
Panel A. One-Year Horizon. (Regressand: ROEi,4 − ROEi,0)
Constant -2.68 0.48 0.35 -1.76 -0.07 -0.55 0.68 -0.43 0.66
(-11.2) (1.65) (1.31) (-4.87) (-0.18) (-1.08) (1.62) (-0.86) (1.65)
VO L (0) -0.238 -0.092 -0.167
(-10.8) (-2.46) (-4.23)








2 9.09 3.97 11.34
(2.30) (0.93) (2.69)
R2 0.000 0.028 0.024 0.009 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.013
N 5,340 4,124 3,353 1,692 1,847 1,484 1,789 1,230 1,554
Panel B. Three-Year Horizon. (Regressand: ROEi,12 − ROEi,0)
Constant -4.29 1.20 -0.70 -4.60 -0.83 1.26 1.51 -0.86 0.19
(-16.2) (3.86) (-2.01) (-8.51) (-1.78) (1.58) (3.21) (-1.54) (0.38)
VO L (0) -0.708 -0.688 -0.545
(-21.8) (-12.4) (-10.6)








2 36.48 18.55 25.52
(6.68) (3.34) (4.77)
R2 0.000 0.108 0.024 0.007 0.025 0.106 0.083 0.031 0.036
N 3,964 3,940 2,312 1,425 1,747 1,424 1,747 832 1,094
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